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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
hTATTOXALADVISORY COHILIYCE~ FOR AERONAUTICS,
Ti-ashington,D. C., January 28,1930.
GEXTLEXEK:The Committee on Aircraft Accidents, organized on October 3, 1928, to continue the work
begun by the Special Committee on the Nomenclature, Subckisiin, and Classitkation of Aircraft Accidents,
has made a careful study of aircraft accidents in accordance with the method of analysis prepared by the specia~
committee and published asTechnical Report NIO.308 of the h’at~ontdAdvismy Committee for Aeronautics. This
study has included in particular the underlying causes of piIots’ errors, especially the physiological causes; the
huge number of spins and stalIsresulting in fatal accidents; and a comparison of the typm of accidents and causes
of accidents in the nditary services on the one hand and in civil aviation on the other.
As a resdt of this study it was deemed desirable that the committee prepare a revision of Technical Report
h’o. 308, clarifying a number of the detitions in the light of the eqerience gained in the ckasiflcation of accidents
in the War, ~Navy,and Commeme Departments.
There is attached hereto a copy of the revised report”on “Aircraft Acciderita-Method of Analysis,” which
includes the accident analysis chart and defitions prepared by the SpeciaI Committee on the hTommclature,
Subdivision, and C1as&cation of Aircraft Accidents, with a number of the defitions chwified; a brief statement
of the organization and work of the speckd committee and of the Committee on Aircraft Accidents; and statisti-
cal tables giving a comparison of the types of accidents and causes of accidents in the miIitary sertices on the
one hand and in civiI a+tion on the other, together with exphnations of some of the important differences noted.
In accordance with resolution adopted at a meetirg of the Committee on Aircraft Accidents held on January
17,1930, I have the honor to recommend that the attached report be published as a Technical Report of the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, to supersede Technical Report No. 30S.
RespectfuUy, .
COMMITTEEON~CRA= ACCIDENTS,
GEORGEK. BURGESS,Chairman.
The EXECUTIVE COWWITZE,
National Adriwry Committeefor Aeronautics,
lTashin@on, D. C.
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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Report Prepared by Conunittee on AirmaftAccidents
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE AND HISTOEY
This report is a nmision and espansion of the report
prepared by the Special Committee on the Nomencla-
ture, Subdivision, and Classification of Aircraft Acci-
dents, which was issued asTechnical Report No. 308 of
the A’ational Advisory Committee for Aeronautioe.
The special committee was orgauized by the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in response to a
request dated February 18, 1928, from the Air Coordi-
nation Committee, which consists of the Assistant Sec-
retaries for Aercnautim in the Departments of War,
Nav, and Commeroe. The request of the Air Coordi-
nation Committee w-asmade “in order that practices
used may henceforth conform to a standard and be
universally comparable.” The task of the special oom-
mittee was, therefore, to preyare a basis for the ckmi-
fication and compassion of airoraft accidents, both
civil and militag-.
The speciaI committee was orgtied in pursuance of
rescdution adopted by the Executive Committee of the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautic on
March 1, 1928, and held its initial meeting on March
19, 192S. Sixteen meetings were held, the hst being
on July 17, 1928. In its final meeting, this special
committee unmirnouely adopted a resolution approving
i~ report, and recommending that it be publkhed by
the A’atiomd Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and
that copies be transmitted ta the War, h’avy, and
Commerce Departments with a recommendation that
the proposed method of analysis of airoraft accidents
outlined in the report be adopted for use in their
respective services. The special committee also recom-
mended that copiw of the report be transmitted ta the
appropriate reprcsmtatiws of the various interested
foreign governments, with a request that they cooper-
ate by contributing information from time h time in
relation to aircraft accidents.
‘fflth the submission of ita report, the epetial com-
mittee stated that it belie-ied its work b be concluded
and that it should be discharged. It was believed,
however, that the introduction of the proposed method
for the analysis of accidents would result in questions
as to interpretation and suggestions for changes, many
of which it was believed had been considered during
the meetings of the committee. It was &o thought
probable that a study of the information obtained from
the application of the method of malysis .would indi-
cate that certain features of aircraft construction or
operation should be given more detailed study or consid-
eration. The committee, therefore, adopted a resolu-
tion recommending that its personnel should be
reorganized into a struding Committee on Aircraft
Accidents of the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics for the purpose of carwider@ from time
to time such new matter as might appear desirable,
or as might be brought before it.
h accordmce with this recommendation a Com-
mittee on Aircraft Accidents was authorized by the
Execut.i~e Committee of the National Advisory Com-
mittee for Aeronautics by rescdution adopted on
October 3,1928. This committee held its first meeting
on March 16, 1929, and has held meetings since that
date.
OBGAWZATIOX
The original orgmization of the standing committee
was M follows:
Representative-s of the iVaiional Advbory Committee for Aero-
nautic:
Dr. George K. Burgess, Chairman.
Mr. George W. Lewis.
Repwzentaticea oj the Army Air (b-pa:
Lieut. D. B. PbiUips, U. S. A.
Lieut. J. D. Barker, U.S. A.
Repreaentaitceaoj the Burem of Aeronauta”os of the Nauy:
Lieut. Commander L C. Stevens (C. C.), U. S. N.
hut. Cbarks R. Brown, U.S. N.
Reprmeniahiee of the Aeronautics Branch, Department of Com-
merca:
Mr. ?&hard P. Howard.
Mr. hater T. Bradbury.
Owing to chang~ in stations of its milita~ members
and other causes, the membemhip of the oo&ittee
has altered in the last year, and at the present time it
is as fonowa :
Representatzki of the National Adwi.wy Committee for Aero-
nauth:
Dr. George K. Burgess, Cbaiian.
Mr. IAhard P. Warner.
Mr. George IV. Lewis.-.
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R6presentative8 of the Armv Air Corp8:
Lieut. Harold Brand, U. S. A.
Lieut. L. P. Whitten, U. S. A.
Repre8entalive8 of the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Naw:
Lieut.. Commander L. C. Stevens (C. C.), U. S. N.
Lieut. Stanhope C. Ring, U. S. N.
Representative of the Aeronautic Branch, Department oj Com-
merce:
Mr. W. Fiske MmehaI1.
COOPERATION OF MEDICAL BRANCHES AND OTHERS
The part that physiologioal and psychological
crmsesplay in aircraft accidents has been appreciated
from thebeginning of the work by thespecialcommittee.
Representativea of the medical branches of all three
services have attended the meetings of the committee
and have participated in the discussions with con-
siderable regularity. on June 29, 1929, a meeting was
held which was devoted chiefly to the discussion of the
physiological and psychological factors of accideni%.
The commit~e believes that the presence of the
representatives of the medical services has been
most helpful and has assisted in the placing of more
accurate values on many of the factors involved in its
study of aircraft accidents. In addition, it is hoped
that in the course of their cooperation with the com-
mittea its medical associates have been afforded a
useful opportunity for the discussion of their common
problems. Certainly the membem of the committie
have gained in appreciation and respect for these
problems.
In addition to the members of the committee, the
following have assisted in the work of the committee:
Repre8enfative of the ArmII Air Corps:
Lleut.CO1.L. M. Hathaway(M. C.), U. S. A.
Iteprewtativw of theNavg:
Commander R. G. ~avie (M. C.), U. S. N.
Lieut. Commander J. R. Poppen (M. C.), U. S. N.
Rapree@alive8 of the Aeronautic Branch, Departmeti of Com-
meree:
Dr. L. H. Bauer.
Dr. H. J. Cooper.
Mr. P. Edgar.
Mr. F, J. Martel.
Mr. E. R. Strong.
Repre8enlative of the National Adviuorg Committee for Aer~
na?dice:
Mr. Starr ‘1’ruscott.
CFiANGES IN OFUOINAL REPORT
As a result of e.xperienoein the use of the method
originally proposed in TechnicaI Report No. 308,
certain changes in the definitions and the explanatory
matter have become desirable. These are not radical
and do not serioudy alter any part. The most notable
is the introduction of a new cIass N “Structural Fail-
ure” under Nature of Accidents, and tie changing of
former chsses L and ~hl to X and Y, respectively.
The “Description and Typical Analysis of anAccident”
has also been espanded somewhat for the sake of
inoressed clearneas.
I
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
D12FIWIIONOF AN AIRCRAFTACCIDENT
An aircraft accident is an occurrence which takes
place while an aircraft is being operated as such aid
as a result of which a pemon or persons are injured or
killed or the aircraft receives appreciable or marked
damage through the forces of external contact or
through fire. A collision of two or mom aircraft
should be anaIyzed and reported statistically as one
accident. It is appreciated that in some cases, as
where a collision in-rolves two aircraft of different
squadrons or diflerent services, it will necessarily
appear in two sepmate accident reports and that n
certairi amount of duplication in tabulation wiIl inovi-
tably be irwol~ed. In such a case each service or
unit involved will credit to its own account only thoso
personnel injuries or fatalities occurring in the air-
ora.ftfor which it is individually responsible.
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS FORM
In drawing up the aircraft accident analysis form
and the accompanying ‘definitions the committee had
in mind the frequency rate of accidents from the various
causes, the logical lines along which studies should bo
conducted, and the ease with which these studies can
be made from this chart. It is recognized that to
make a “detailed study of accidents due to any onc
cause a further subdivision may be necessary. How-
ever, if aH accidents are classified according to this
chart the major causes can be easily det.erminwl and
further investigation can be readily carried out for the
rmrpose of eliminating these causes.
It was also recognized, in working out this chart,
that the dkision of immediate causes between pcr-
acmneland mat&ieJas set forth in the chart and defh~i-
tions was more or leas arbitrary, since all defects of
aircraft can in the last amdysis be attributed to errors
of personnel, whether in operation, inspection, main-
tenance, manufacture, or design. Since the purposes
of the accident study seemed to be best served by
draw~” attention to defects of mat&iel, even though
traceable ultimately to personnel errors, the line
betwean personnel and mathiel in the immediat~
causes .WS’Sdrawn at the operating penonncl of tho
aircraft, In other words, under the main heading
“Personnel” there are included only those accidents
for which personnel engaged in operating the aricrFIfb
are responsible. Accidents due to mat,4rie1 failuro
are ch.ssifhd under ‘‘ Alatkkkd” even though pemonncl
charged with design, construction, or operation may
be held resonsible for the failure. Errors due to
personnel other than those immediately accessory tu
the operation of the aircraft me shown in the “ thdcr-
lying causes” or “Goss analysis,” as set forth hcrcin-
-.
after, rather than in the main headings of immediate
causes.
AIRCILU?T
The pkm as drawn up by the committee is not in
any sense Ed or complete, but is presented to provide
a working basis for the study of aircraft accidents
from alI sources.
~HGH~G OF AC~ESTS
‘il’here two or more factors cause an accident, part
wiUbe charged to each; for example, in the case of an
avoidable accident following an engine faihre the
responsibihty for the accident might be com=idered
to be equally divided between the pilot and the power
plant, in which case 50 per cent xould be charged to
“Personnel” and 50 per cent to “S1at4rie1.” If the
responsibility for the accident rested largely upon the
pilot, “Personnel” would be charged with 60, 70, or
SOper cent of the accident, or e~en more, depending
upon the degree of responsibility decided upon. Con-
-weeIy in the above cases “lfatc%iel” and “Niscella-
neous” would be charged with a total of 40, 30, or 20
per cent of the accident. This same di=lon of respon-
sibility might be carried out under ‘tPersonnel” or
other subheads. However, in the particular case cited
“Errors of pilot” wouId be the onIy division of “Per-
sonnel” which ccndd be charged with this accident.
If 80 per cent of the accident were charged to “Per-
sonnel” in the above instance, then 80 per cent of the
accident wouId be charged to “Errors of pilot.” Then,
resuming that the responsibility for such piIoting error
rested jointly upon error of judgment and ~r tech-
nique, a stiU further subdivision vrould be made and
40 per cent of the accident would be charged to “Error
of judgment” and 40 per cent to “Poor technique.”
Thus the factors of each crash could be traced down to
the last subdivkion under any heading and v+ghted
in accordance with their importance
CL4SSIFICATIO~OF ACCIDENTS
For the purpose of comparathe study aircraft acci-
dents may be divided into groups of accidents of the
same general characteristic=. Accident pre-wntion
must be regarded as the primary purpose of aircraft
study. Studies of accident causes point out needed
remedies more cIearly when they are supplemented by
certain studies based upon the nature and resdts of
the accident.
For axample, in both bad Lm3ings and tail spins the
principal cause is usually errors of the pilot. Statistim
based upon the study of causes merely show that pilots’
errors are responsible for more than half of all accidents,
and the formulation of remedies for the situation ap-
pears diflicult. If, however, the sme accidents am
classified according to their nature and resuIts, it is
found that the tail spin is the kind of accident that is
by far the most prevalent among those which produce
fatal consequences. It is apparent that new designs
which decrease the tendency of airplanes to spin, or
new training methods wbicb increase the ability of
piIots to cmoid faLIinginto spine and to recover from
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them quickly, will ha-ie a marked influence toward the
pre~eption of fhd accidents.
Likewise, the study based upon nature and results
indicates, in the case of collisions, that this kind of
accident is third in importance among those which
produce fatal results, and that these accidents are much
more prevalent during winter months than in summer;
and -diIe remedies are not so obvious as in the case of
tail spins some lines of attack immediately suggest
themsehes.
The foIlowing ehssifications for study of accidents
accorc@ to their nature are recommended:
L X~’rUBEOETHEACCID~T
under this head accidents are classified according to
the type of accident which occurs.
I. Clam A-Collisions in jull jight with other air-
crafi.-!l%is includea collisions with airplanes, bal-
Ioons, or other aircraft while the colliding aircraft?is at
flying speed or at an altitude which permits free ma-
neu-rering. It edudes collisions (1) on the gro~d
whiIe tayring, taking off, or landing, and (2) in the
air immediately before Ianding or after taking off and
while the airplaneis at or near it9minimum flying speed.
2. Claw B—(7011im”onsin full$ight un”thobjects other
than airmafi.—Tbis includes ccdlisions vrhiIeat flying
speed and with power phmt functioning norndy with
trees, pol=, houses, mountain sides, or other obstacks.
It includes colIisionewith the earth or water by diving.
It excludes collisions (1) on the ground while t=ying,
taking off, or hiding, and (2) in the air immediately
before landing or after tahg off and whalethe airplane
is at or near its minimum flying speed.
3. Class C—Spins or stallsfollowing enginejailure.—
This includes spins, stalk, and all collisions with the
earth while the aiqdane is out of control due to 10SSof
flying speed following engine failure.
4. Class D-Spins or stalk without engt”nefailure.—
This idudes spins, stalls, and aI1collisions with the
earth while the airphne is out of contiol foIIowi.ngloss of
flying speed, with the engine functioning normally. It
includes spins due to defecti~e handling qualities of
the airplane.
5. Class E—Forced landing8.—This co~em accidents
while making landings necessitated by conditions
which could not be owmome whiIe in flight. Such con-
ditions include engine trouble, loss of knowledge of the
direction to the destination or the location on the map
of the aircraft’s position, bad weather, darkness, and
exhaustion of fuel.
6. Ci’a8sF—Landing accidenk-l!?’his includes acci-
dents vdde the pilot is in the act of executing a ToIu.u:
tary landing. It does not include forced kmdings or
accidents vdde a~amining a field fmm the air or ap-
proachhg it for a landing.
7. flaw (& Take-oj accidenfs.-This includes acci-
dents occurring between the time of starting a take-off
to the time when full flying speed is ~ained and contact
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AIRCRAFT
with the ground has been lost, except those covered
under other cksfications, as, for instance, spins or
forced landings.
8. Clas8 H—Tazying accidt?nt8.-Thk includes aU
accidents which occur while the aircraft is maneuvering
under its own power on kind or water. It excludea
accidents while the aircraft is still rolling after a landing
or while it is getting up speed for a take-off.
9. G7awI—Fires in the a{r.—Thia imdudes aII acci-
dents in which fire breaks out, either as a cause or
result of the occurrence, while the aircraft is in flight.
10. (?fass J—(%rrier, pla~orm, and arwting-gear
accident8.-This inchdee accidents ocourring while
the aircraft is Ian&g upon or taking off from (1) the
deck of a floating aircraft carrier, or (2) an eIevated
platform intended for the landing and taking off of
&craft, but excludes Iaunching-ge-m accidents:
11. (?la88 hr—bwwhing+ear acciden&.-This h-
oludes accidents during take-off in which the aircraft
is assisted in gaining frying speed by the application of
an external force.
12. Claw N-f%uctural faiZure.-This includes all
accidents which occur as a result of the failure, whiIe
in f@ht, of any part of the structure of the aircraft
and which are not caused by contact with any externsd
object.
13. ~w A“—ilf&e&meou8.-This includes acci-
dents the nature of which is knowR but which do not
fall into one of the above &s&cations.
14. Cfa8~ Y—Indeterminate and &ubtjid.-This
includes all accidents concem.ing the nature of which
so little is known that any clastication cm not be
in~~entiy accomplished.
II NmEYTOPEBSO~=
Under this head accidents are claed according
to the injury suffered by personnel
1. (?fa8sA—A “ass A“ injury is one rsmdfiingin
the death of the individud within a period of 90 clap.
2. CZawB.—A’( Class B” injury is one resulting in
serious injury to the individual. Because of the dif6-
cuIties of chssifhation, the opinion of a physician
should be obtained whenever possible as to whether
an injury is sewre or minor. When a physician is not
avaiIable, the following general rulesshould be foIIowed:
Auy injury that rsmdts in uncunsciousnes; any frac-
ture of any bone except simple fractures of the flngera
and toes; lacerations that involve muscka or cause
severe hemorrhage; any injury to my interred organ;
or any other injury that it seems probable mill inca-
pacitate the individual for more than five days should
be classedas a severe injury. All other injuries should
be ckssed as minor.
3. C’fas8C.—A “C1ass C“ injuqy is one resuI&g in
only minor injury to the individmd.
4. CifM.SD.—Any pemonnel who experience an
aviation accident with no personaI injury shaLI be
classified as “Class D.”
410so-314
I
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Nom.-The classification of an accident according
to injury to personnel shall contain a letter for each
individua in the aircraft at the time of the accident,
the ht of th~e lettera representing the pflot of the
aircraft. For example, in an accident where the pilot
is killed, one passenger serioudy injured, and the re-
maining passenger escapes with only tier injury the
accident would be olasstied as a C1assABC accident.
Had the pilot escaped with minor injury and both
passengersbeen kiUed,it would ha=rebeen a Class CM
acoident.
m. D-AGE TOMATfilZIllL
Under this head accidents are dassitied according to
the amount of damage which occurs to mat4rieI.
1. Clam A.-This includes all accidents as a result
of which the aircraft is of no further value except for
salvage of usable parts.
2. Cling B.—This includes all accidents as a result
of which it is nec~ary to completely overhaul the
aircraft before it would be again airworthy.
3. ~a88 C.—This includes W accidents as a resdt
of which it is necessary i%replace some major assembly
of the aircraft before it would be again airworthy,
such as a wing, fusehge, undercarriage, taiI, or engine.
Accidents in which damage tcI the engine was a
cause and not a red are excluded from this category
urdess the additiord damage warrants such.
4. CZassD.—This includes all incidents which be-
cause of other factors come within the category of an
aircraft accident and as a rwult of which there is only
minor and easily repairable damage to the aircraft,
such as a broken tail sk~~,wheel, bent propelIer tip, etci.
5. Cl&s l?.-This includes all incidents similar to
Class D accidents above in which there is no damage
to mat&ieL
6. ~a88 F.—” Class F“ ia included in this analysis
only becausa of the interest it may have for the dif-
ferent organizations which may um this method of
fulaly~~. It ccmists of mat&iel failures which did
not resuhtin an accident, and, strictly speaking, does
not aotualIy fit intQ an accident analysis. However,
the methods hem used for mmlyzhg mattiel failures
which did result in accidents can as easiIy be apphd
to those which did not, and thus afford a method of
studying the potential accidents, which because of
other reasons did not occur, such as a successful land-
ing after engine faihre, etc.
CAUSESOF ~CCIDE~TS
The following classifications for the study of aircraft
accidents according to their causes are recommended:
A.IMJ1llOIATECAESESOF~OEAFTACCIDE.WW
The following is a proposed Iist of immediate stsnd-
ard causes of aircraft accidents, with deilnitions where
considered necessary for clarity.
I. Personnel.-This includes all accidents which can
be traced to persons accesso~ to the operation of the
.
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aircraft, either on the ground or b the air. This does
not include accidents due to errors or omissions of
perscnud charged with the design, manufacture, main-
tenance, or inspection of aircraft.
1. ERRORSOF PILOT.-ThiS includes all accidents
the responsibility for which rests upon the pilot.
The pilot is the actual manipulator of the con-
trols or the individual responsible for their
correct manipulation.
(a) ERROR OF“JUD~MENT.—ThiSncludes au ac-
cidents resulting from a decision made by
the pflot which was not the best possible
under existing circumstances.
@) POORTECHNIQUE.—ThiSincludes all acci-
dents resulting from lack of &U, dexterity,
or coordination of the senses in handling
aircraft controls, whether traceable to inher-
ent inability to attain such or to infrequent
flying, lack of experience in flying, lack of
experience in flying under particular con-
ditions, or in the particular type of aircraft.
Yoml+hul.gment involves mental ac-
tivity only for the purpose of arriving at
decisions as to the ends to be attained and
the genera3course to be followed.
Technique is the physical expression of
the mental decisions which have been made.
See example on page 551.
{c) DISOBEDIENCEor ORDERS.—ThiSincludes all
accidents resulting from the violation or
disobedience of 10CSIor general orders or
regulations or provisions of law governing
the operation of aircraft, such as low acro-
batics, acrobatics in aircraft not b be
used for such purposes, or any other type
or manner of operation specifically for-
bidden by ordera or regulations issued by
competent authorities.
(d) CARELESSNESSOR NEGLIGEN~.-ThiS in-
cludes aIl accidents resulting from the
absence of care on the part of the pilot
according to circumstances or the faiIure
to use that degree of care which the circum-
stances justIy demand, either on the ground
or in the air, such as careless manipulation
of the controls of an aircraft, failure ta
ascertain the amount of gasoline on board
before taking off, failure to ascerhim the
“ conditions of the instruments, etc.
(e) llISCELLAN~OUS.-ThiSincludes all accidents
resulting from errors of the pilot not ac-
counted for above.
2, ERRORSOFSEPERVISOHYP~RSONNEL.—ThiSin-
cludes aIl accidents the responsibility for which
reds upon individuals other than the pilot who
esercise control over the operation of the
aircraft, such as na~ators, formation section
leaders, ground-operations officers, etc.
3. ERRORS OF OTHERPmsoNNm~This includes
all accidents the responsibility for which resti
upon other personnel directly concerned with
the operation of the aircraft, such as members
of the flight and ground crews of the aircraft~
aerographers, etc. It doeanot include accidents
~ due to errors or omissions of peraonnel in con-
nection with their duties of maintenance and
inspection of aircraft.
II: Maf&iel.-This includes all accidents resulting
from failures of the airplane, power plant, accessories,
and lawching and arrestingdevices, whether trace~blc
to materiak, faulty desigyi,maintenance, or inspection,
1. POWER-PLANTFMLURE.—TbiSincludes alI acci-
dents resuhing from failure or malfunctioning
of the propelling system and all. auxiliaries
essent.ialto its proper functioning, exclusive of
instruments.
(a) FUELSYSTEM,
(b) C’OOLINGSYSTEM.
(c) IGNImONSYSTEM.
(cl) LUBRICATIONSYSTEM.
(e) ENINE STRUCTURE.
~ PROPELLERANDPROPELLERACCESSORIES.
(g) ENGINE CONTROLSYSTEM(THROTTLEROD,
ETC.).
(h) MISCELLANEOUS.
(~) U~ETERMINED.
2. STRUCTURALFAILURE. This includes all acci-
dents resulting from failures of the airplane
exclusive of the propelling system and instru-
ments,
(a} I?LIGHT coNTRoL6YSTEM.
(~) lfOvABLE surmAcm.
(c) STABILIZINGSURFACES.
(d) ~INGS, STRUTS,AND BRACING.
(e) LAND]KGGEAR.—This includes all accidenta
resulting from failure of the landing-gear
struts and shock-absorbing gear, but does
not include accidents resulting from failure
of the wheels or floats attached thereto.
~ WHEEL6,7xREs,AND BRAKES.
(j) SEAPLANEFLOATORBOAT,
(h.) FUSELAGE,ENGINEMOUNT,ANDIWTTINGS.
(~) TAIL SKIDORWHEELASSEMBLY,
(j~ .~RRESTINGAPPLIANCESONAIRCRAFT.
(k) M16cELLANE0us.
(1) WOETEEUINED.
3. HANDLINGQUALITIES.-ThiS includes all acci-
dents resulting from those peculiar character-
istics of certain types of aircraft tiecting their
controllability while on the ground or in the
‘ air, such as marked tendency to ground loop,
inability to recover from a spin, etc.
4. instruments.-This includes d accidenta re-
sultig from failures of instruments which
were essential to operation under the conditions
of the flight.
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5. hUXCHIXG DEVICES.—ThiS includes all ac~-
dents resulting from faikre or malfunctioning
of catapults.
6. ~RRESTINGDEVICES.-ThiS imdudes all aca-
dents resulting from failure or malfunctioning
of arresting gear not a part of the aircraft.
III. MisceRaneous.-This includes all accidents not
accounted for abo~e.
1. WEATHER.-ThiS includes aU accidents restdting
from conditions of the weather which could not
reasonably have been foreseen and a~oided.
(Ilention ma-ybe made on the chart of contrib-
uting weather causes, as fog, gaIe, ice, haiI,
snow, rain, lightning, etc.)
!?. DARICXESS.-ThiSirdudes alI accidents resulting
from conditions due to nightfall which could not
reasonably ha-re been foreseen and avoided.
3. &EPORTORTEmurN.-This includ= all accidents
resulting from airports or landing conditions of
places which ccndd not reasonably ha-ie been
detected or avoided. (Forced Iandings shouId
be charged to power phmt, etc., unIess report
shows that a piloting error -occurred in which
case the accident would be analyzed accord-
ingly.)
4. OTHEE.—ThiB includes all ticcidents resulting
from causes not otherwise accounted for abcme.
IJ’. ~’ndeterminedand doubtj%l.
B. UXDZRLYISG CAUSE9 OF AJECRAFT ACCIDES71’S
The folIowing is a Iiat of standard underlying causes
of aircraft accidents, with definitions where considered
necessary for chrity.
I. .&Or8 of j7izOi .—Eeturning to “ErTors of piIot,”
paragraph I, subparagraph 1, above, the subdivisions
of this paragraph were made according to the immedi-
ate causes of the errors attributed to the piIot, such as
an “Error of judgment,” ‘~Poor technique,” etc. The
underlfig causes of such errors may frequently be
of more interest than the actual causes themselves.
These causes may be defined as those elements which
contributed to the piIot’s mental and physical equip-
ment at the time of the accident or to the deficiencies
which efited in such equipment.
1. LACK OF EXPERIENCE.-ThiS includes all ami-
dents resulting from insuflkient personal ac-
quaintance with the actual conditions which
had to be met under the circumstances.
la) bcK OFGENERALExpEm~-cE.-Tbis inchdes
SUaccidents resuhing from a lack of exper-
ience in the general problems of atiation,
such es Ianding, taking off, air work, etc.
(1) Lack of total general experience.-This
includes d accidents resulting from a
lack of general experience due to the
fact, that the indi-ridual concerned has
never engaged in such work for a suiii-
cient period of time to acquire the necea-
ssry experience to have avoided such
accidents.
(2) Lack of recent general experience.—This
includes all accidents resulting from a
lack of generaI ability due to the fact
that the individual concerned has too
infrequently engaged in general flying
activities prior to the accident-, and
consequently lost the ability he had
originally acquired.
(b) L.AcKOFSPECIAL?UmERIEKCE.-ThiSincludee
sIl accidents resulting from a lack of
experience in speciaI problems of avia-
tion, such as certain features of cross-
country flying (wtich might, for emmple,
require an intimate knowledge of the
terrain of a certain motion), carrier
operations, night flying, blind flying, etc.
(1) Lack of total specia~ experimce.—Thia
—
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incIudes SU accidents resulting from. a
lack of special experience due to the fact
that the individual had ~ever engaged in.
such special problems for a sticient
period of tie to acquire the necessary
experience to have avoided such acci-
dents.
(2) Lack of recent specifd experience.-This .=
includes alI acadents r&Mng from a
lack of ability in the special probkrns
due to the fact that the individual con-
cerned has too infrequently engaged in
speciaI flyi~mactivities prior to the acci-
dent, and consequently lost the ability he
had originalityacquired.
2. PHySIC.AL~WD PSYCHOLOGICtiCAUSES—ThiS
irdudes aII accidents resulting horn a demon-
strable disease or defect or poor reaction.
(a) DISEASEOR DEFECT.-TMS includes all acci-
dents resulting from a disease or defect,
demonstrable by physiod (including nerv-
ous system) examination.
(1) Inherent disease or defect.—This inchdes
all accidents remdting flom a disease or
defect which is not susceptible to remedy
within a reasonable period of time, such
as o-rershooting a field, faulty kmdings or
coWsion because of defeotive vision or
judgment of distance; unconsciousness;
hysterical or epiIeptic tendency; chronic
air sickness; inability to withstand ski-
tude, etc. The history of u individual
may often be necessmy to determine if a
disease or defect is inherent.
(2) Temporary diseaseor defeot.-This includee
aII accidents resulting from a disease or
defect which is remediable and one which
.-
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may not be expected to repeat itself with
undue frequency in the individual con-
cerned, such as fatigue, either mental or
muscuIar, stsleness, temporary ilhwssj
incomplete convalescence, etc.
(b) POORREACTION.-ThiSincludes all accidents
(1)
(2)
which rewilt from no demonstrable disease
or defect but from psychological causes,
making the individual react either erro-
neously or slowly to a situation, such as
sdecting what is manifestly the poorer of
two fields for an emergency lading, per-
sisting on a course when better judgment
would indicate that he should kind or turn
back, indu&ng in acrobatics over pro-
hibited areas or at too low altitude, etc.
Pocr reaction, inherent.-Thie includes all
accidents resulting from psychological
causes which apparently are not sus-
ceptible to correction within a reaaonable
period of time. The history of the indi-
vidual would be a very important ad-
junct in determing if such poor reaction
were inherent and its repetition to be
frequently expected.
Poor reaction, kunpor~.-This includes
all accidents remdting from psychological
causes which apparently are subject to
correction, disciplinary or otherwise,
within a reasonable period of time.
II. Mak%i.d faiZums.-The underlying causes of
“mat&iel faiIuree” should aIso prove of considerable
interest in anaIyzing accidents.
1. FAULTYINSTRUO’MONS,-ThiSincludes all acci-
dents resulting frcm mat4rielfailurm which were
traceable to errors or omissions in the standard
instructions covering the use of such matt%iel.
(a) FAULTY OPERATING INSTZtUC~ONS.-ThiS in-
cludes alI accidents resulting from mat6riel
fadures which were traceable to the opera-
tion of such mat&iel in accordance with
standard instructions which prove to be
incorrect or incomplete, such as instruc-
tions governing the use of the mixture con-
trol which when carried out are found to
damage the engine, instructions governing
the proper engine operating temperature
which when carried out are found to dam-
age the engine, etc.
(b) FAULTY bfAmTENAN6EItiSTRU~ONS.-ThiS
includes all accidentsresultingfrom matiriel
failures which were traceable to the main-
tenance of such mat&iel in accordance with
standard instructions which prcve to be
incorrect or incomplete, such as instructions
governing the type of protective coating to
cover duralumin parts when operating as a
seaplane, etc.
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2. FAULTY INspmmoN.-Thia includes all accidents
resulting from mattiel failures which wore
traceable to errors or omiesions in thoinspection
.of such mat6riel,
((2) FAULTY MANUFACTWUNGINSPECTION.-ThiS
includes all accide4b traceable to faulty
inspection of matiriel where such errore or
omissions occurred prior to the receipt of
this mattisl by the consumer.
(b) FAULTYovmzHAu~rNsF’EcTIoN.-Thisincludes
all accidents traceable to fauIty inspection
of mat&iel where such errors or omissions
occurred during overhaul or storage of the
mat&ieI,
(c) FAULTYMAINTENANCEtiBP~CTION.-ThiS in-
chd= all accidents traceable to faulty in-
spection or mattiel where such errors or
on+iona in inspection occurred after the
final delivery of this mat6riel to the operak
iug unit,
(d) FAULTYINSPECTION,IND~TERMINATE.—ThiS
includ= alI accidents traceable to faulty
inspection of rnatiriel where actual respon-
sibility for the errors or omissions in in-
spection can not be definitdy placed,
3. FAULTY MATERIAIA-ThiS includes all acci-
dents remdting from matkzielfailures which
were traceabb to defective materials when
such defects in materials could not reason-
ably have been det~cted and eliminated by
a proper system of inspoctiona
(a) ORIGINALLYDE~EOTIVEMATERrALS.-ThiSin-
cludes all accidents traceable to faulty
materials where the materials contained
such defects when originally delivered.
(b) DETERIORATEDMATIMUALS,-ThiSincludes all
accidents traceable to faulty materiaki
where the defects of such materialsoccurred
through deterioration aftix dcJivery.
(c) FAULTY MATERIALS,INDETERMINATE.—ThiS
includea a.11accidents traceable to faulty
materials where it is not possible to deter-
mine the actual time or place when such
defgwtafist appeared.
4. FAULTYDEstGN.-This includes all accidents ‘
resulting from mat&iel failures which were
traceable to errors or omissions in the origka~
design of such mat&iel.
(a) FAULTYDESIGN,OEIGINAL.-TMSinchdcs all
ac+identa traceable to faulty design whore
such errcre or omissions in design occurred
in the original design of such mab%iel, or
in the course of changes initiated or directed
by persons having recognized mdhority re-
garding desi=~ or construction.
(1) Fatity original de&n, structural strength.
(2) Faulty original design, arrangement,
(3) Faulty original design, aerodynamic.
(4)
(b)
AIRcRAFr
Faulty originaI dwign, indekmninate.
FAULTY DESIGN,MODWICATION.-TMSin-
cludesdlaccidentst raceable to fau&d&gn
where such errors or omissions in design
occurred in modhications to the origimd
design of such mat&ieI initiated or directed
by persons not having recognized authoti~
regarding design or construction (such as
j~ rigs, ==gency repairs, etc.).
5. INDETERMINATEMATIhIEL l?AILt~E.-This in-
cludes alI accidents from mat&iel failures the
react source of which can not be determined.
ALLOCATIONOl? ACCIDENTS
In compihng statistics an accident should be allo-
cated to the service or organization having jurisdiction
over or control of the operation of the aircraft at the
time of the accident. h the case of colhsions the
accident itseIf should be analyzed as a single accident,
but should be carried statistictiy by each of the
organizations involved.
Injuries and fatalities shouId be docated according
to the aimraft in whioh they occur.
DESCRIPTIONAND TYPICALANALYSISOF AN
ACCD)ENT
PiIot John Doe was flying in a seaplane at 200 feet
tdtitude over a point of Iand between a bay and the
open sea when the engine stopped. Pilot Doe had an
opportunity to land either directly into the wind in the
open sea or cross wind in the bay. He started to land
in the ocean, but at 100 feet altitude he changed his
mind and attempted to turn so as to Iand in the bay.
In turning, Doe heId the nose of the seaplane up, stakl
it, and spun into the land. The seaplane was demol-
ished, the pilot was seriousIy injured, and the passenger
was Idled.
Doe,
atidor
according h his record, was an experienced
with 30 hours’ flying during the preceding
month and with recent experience in stunting ‘&planm~
Examination of the engine showed that one of the
teeth in the ma=~eto timing gear had stripped, the
broken tooth having been drawn into the other teeth,
causing the eventwd stripping of aU teeth. The
origimd break was determined to be a visible hardening
crack.
The NATUREof this accident is C1ass C=Tail spin
foIIowing engine faihwe, as defied on page 545. The
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chssi&ation aocording to EESULTSis l%rsonnel, C!Iass
BA (p. 547); Mat&ieI, C1= A.
Jn ardyzing this accident the IMMEDWTECAUSEis
charged, as indicated on the amdysis chart, as 75 per
cent “PereonneI” and 25 per’ cent ‘fMat&iel,” for the
reason that the account of the accident shows that the
pilot had two chances to make a safe landing and took
advantage of neither of them. Considering the 75 per
cent which is charged to “Personncil”, it is obvious
that this is chargeable neither to “Errors of supe.r-
visary personnel” nor to “Errors of other personnel,”
so that the whole wei&, 75 p= cent, must be placed
under “Errors of piIot.” It appears that tie errors
of the pfiot invohwd both errors of judgment and poor
technique. He fit decided to Iand straight ahead
in the ocean, which was a proper decision. Then, after
reaching an altitude at which turning without power
is genertiy considered dangmous, he decided to turn
and kind in the bay. This was an error and showed
poor judgment. Poor technique was displayed in the
execution of this decision in that the piIot continued
to pfl the nose up, stiII furthm stalling the seaplane,
when he shotid have sensed the approaching staII.
It is considered that a charge of 35 per cent to “Error
of judgment” and 40 per cent to “Poor technique”
represenk as near an approximation as can be arrived
Ot in this case.
on amdysis of UNDERLYINGCAUSES it would appear
that the “Error of judgment” and “Pcmr technique”
were both due to a “Temporary poor reaction” with a
ShOIlgpossibili~ of SU8h“poor reaction” b- ‘inh-
erent” rather than “Temporary.” Howe~er, h the
absence of a history of the individud this would have
to be classified as “Tem~rary.”
Considering the 25 per cent charged to “11. lfat6-
rkl,” the entire 25 per cent obviously should be
tied tO “ 1. pow=-p~~t fdure,” in the second
order of subdivision, and again in the third order of
subdivision the entire 25 per cent should be charged
to “ (c) Ignition system.”
The underlying cause of this mat&iel failure is
unquestionably faulty manufacturing and accordingly
on the cross adysis it would be placed under the head
of Wanufactu.ring inspection.”
~TERPRETATION OF DEFINITIONS AND, METHODS
As was anticipated, questions have arisen regarding
the proper interpretation of the deilnitions and the
methods to be folIowed in us@ the proposed method
of am&sis. These questions have generalIy been
referred to the oommittee for options or the interpre-
tations followed have be.m communicated for approval.
In this manner there has been established a sort of
approved procedure.
b early criticism was the e.fkot of the personat
factor on the weights to be assigned to the mrious
cam= of an accident. That the average obtained
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from a considerable number of cases can not be far
OR is shown by the results from a test conducted by
the origid special committee, but not mentioned in
its report. Six accidents were reported in identical
form to each member of the committee and were
analyzed independently by him. The percentages
assigned the rarious causes were then averaged and
the a-ierages were compared with the individud
ratings. E-rery member was willing to accept the
average dues as a fair amdysis of the various acci-
dents, and the differences between the values assigned
by the inditiduds and the a-ierages were remarkably
small.
RESULTSFROM USEOF PROPOSEDMETHODOF
AXALYSLS
The method of analysis proposed in the report of
the special committee has been in use by both of the
militmy semices-that. is, the &my and the h-av—
and the Department of Commerce for a I.itle more than
a year. AU accidents are analyzed by” this method
and the resultsgiwn criticaIstudy. A comidemtion of
the resuIts from the study of accidents which occurred
before Janmmy, 1929, is of particular interest.
The three services ha~e analyzed the accidents
which occurred to airplaiws under their respectire
jurisdictions during thk period, ha-re classified them
according to nature, and hare assigned responsibility
for their occurrence to the various causes. The acci-
dents considered include 1,432 from the military
ser-rices and 1,400 from citi aeronautics under the
jurisdiction of the Aeronautics Brmch of the Depart-
ment of Commerce. No accidents to lighter-then-air
craft are incIuded. From the data prcmided by the
individual services have been prepared the two follovr-
ing tables in which the a~erage occurrence by nature
and the average flotation of causes are represented by
percentages:
NATURE OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTSIN PER-
CENTAGES
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It should be remembered that the accidents covered
by this study alI occurred before January, 1929.
Many of them date back several years to the ~ery
beginning of the organized control of civil aeronautics
and to a time when the airplanes available to the mili-
tsry serrices SW included many of war-time origg.
& that time possibly one-half of the pilots and air-
phmes, composing civ-d aviation and @ring in these
statistics, were unlicensed and not subject to regulation
by the Department of Commerce. Wooden prope~ers
were stiII largeIy used. The systems for training civil
and military pilots, while improving, were stilI not as
good as now USS, and it should not be forgotten that
training accidents must aIwqs contribute hugely to
the statistics of airphme accidents. One of the facts
brought out bF the study of the accidents which have
been anaIyzed by the miIitary sertices is that of the
total number of accidents 30 per cent are due to st~[dent
training and 20 per cent to the training of reserves.
In further analysis of the student accidents it was found
that SOper cent cmdd be attributed to errors of per-
sonnel. Furthermore, the great development of civd
landing fiehis and aids to navigation either had not
begun or was only partly accomplished.
In tiew of the foregoing, the agreement between the
proportions assigned by the rwpective serrkes to the
difterent natures of accidents and especially to the dif-
ferent causes is remarkable. It is beliemd that these
minor differences in reality refkwt the differences be-
tween the services and their demands on piIots and
machines, and that in order to understand the @res
of these tables, it is essent,iaIto consider the tiions
and conditions of operation that affected the two
branches of aviation.
Com~iderfirst the tabulation under “~’ature of acci-
dent.” Bwause of the demands upon semice pilots
for maneuvers in formations and tactics simulating
war conditions, they were naturally exposed to a
greater degree to the hazard of collkion with other air-
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craft. On the other hand, the airports and nditary
basw from which these pilots operated were in a large
measure better suited for use and freer from obstacles
interfering with the approaches than were the small
fieIds from which so many of the civilian piIota had to
fly. Hence, it is not surprising that civilian airplanes
more often collided with fixed objects.
The comparisons under the heading of spins after
engine failure and spine without engine failure are
believed to show the influence of two factors. The
difference between the figures for spins or stalk after
engine failure is believed to reflect the uniformity of
training programs and methods in the Army and FTavy
and the standardization of instruction. Them natur-
ally provided a more thorough schooling for the student
than could the decentralized schools of commerchd
aviation, only a few of which even now conform to the
highest rating of the Department of Commerce. Con-
sidering spins or stalls without engine failure, it sho@d
be remembered that military airpkmes are generally
higher powered than are ciwil airplanes. Therefore
the range of speeda available to them is higher, and
reserve power is available to help the pilot extricate
himself from a situation which might otherwise result
in a stall and subsequent spin.
Forced landings and landing accidents may be con-
sidered together. The fact that military pilots are
often required to operate over open water in land air-
pkmes, and reguhdy operate over the open sea in sea-
planes, and the fact that military airplanes usuaUy
operate at higher landing speeds, account for the
greater proportion in the military services. Further-
more, it may be doubted if the civil branch has aIways
received full reports of such accidents, whereas in the
military earvices, such data have been reguhwly re-
quired and the habit of discipline makes their supply
in full detad a matter of course.
Take-off accidents can be bkuned again on the
poorer type of airport which often had to be used by
civil flyers and upon the lower powered engines,
whereas the greater proportion of taqing accidents
in the military services probably reflects the crowded
conditions of the Isnding fields prevalent during the
operation of large squadrons and flights.
The figures for fie in the air are practicably the
same, and the only comment required is to emphasize
the relative infrequence and the belief that it is grcw-
ing less frequent.
Carrier, pIatform, arresting, and launching gear acci-
dents have been peculiar to naval avaition. This type
of equipment has not been in general use by either
civil aviation or by the hmy. Hence accidents of
this class during the period considered were all from
the Navy.
The appearance in the Army and ~avy of a smaller
proportion of accidents classified by nature as “Struc-
tural failure” is believed to show the value of standard
specifications for materiale and rigorous supervision of
design and construction. Howeverj raferance to tho
analysis according to causes shows that structural
failure figured to a larger degreo in accidmds in tho
military services than in civil aviation. This apparcmt
conflic’t disappeam when it is remembered that in
classifying accidents according to nature the wholo
accident is assigned to the class to which it seems to
belong, while in analyzing according to causes every
contributing cause is entered and ita relative weight in
causing the accident is estimated. Hence accidents
will appear as having the naturo of “Structural failure”
orJy when a structural failure is the outstanding char-
acte&tic and obviously major cause. Howover, shnm-
tural failures often appear following the beginning of
the trouble which produces accidents which aro classi-
fied under other headings, as far as nature of accident
is cogcerned. In these cases the analysis according
to ca~es. will show structural failure to a gmatar or
less degree but it will not appear at all under nature of
accident.
It-k suggested that in addition to supervising design
more closely, the military smvices in analyzing acci-
denti are more apt to assign structural failure as a
con~butory cause than am those who analyzo acci-
dents for the Department of Commerce. Hard usago
and bad landings in the military services aro more apt
to be considered a setice condition to bo regularly
anticipated and ta meet which the airplane must bo
dasigned. Just because of the greater demands mado
on the airplane and the correspondingly stricter control
over design, when a structural member does givo way
(even though the pilot or other factors am prima-
rily at fault), the military semices consider that when
ever practicable such members should be mado stronger
in order to avoid similar accidents in other scrvioo
airplanes of the same typo.
The higher figures for cid aircraft in the misccllano-
one, indeterminate, and doubtful classes probably
again ieflect the difliculty met by the Department of
commarce in obtaining full and comprehensive rcporb
of the mishaps.
C@ider now the anslyaia according to “Causes of
accidents.” The hat two items show that tho judg-
ment-and technique of the piIots in milita~ and civil
aviation were about on a par, but tho third and fourth
items clearly show the results of discipline in tho
rnihta~ services.
T@ part which miscellaneous personnel and other
peraormeI causes played in causing accidents plainly
was small in both organizations.
Power-plant failures appear to have had a larger
i.duence in causing accidents to the military airplane
than to the civil. This is to be expected, because, as
mentioned above, with some types of military airplanos,
often operated over the open sea, a dead engine moan~
almost a sure accident, while much civiI flying still
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consisted of relatively short flights in the neighbor-
hood of Ianding hkls.
“Structural faihre” hss aheridy been discussed in
connection with the discussion of the “ IWature” of
accidents. Ho~ever, at this point attention is invited
to the fact that failures of Ianding gear, wheels, tires,
etc., are a regular result of operation over &fiictit
terrain. At the same time they are decidedIy minor
accidents which are, no doubt, frequently not reported
by the civil pilot with the particularity demanded of
military personrd. This explains the marked differ-
ences in the corresponding percentages under civil and
military aircraft.
Unti.Iwe reach ‘Weather” the dHerences between
the military and citi proportions of the succeeding
items are too smfl ta require comment.
The huger part which weather played in civil acci-
dents might be expected. Full aerological information
with speoid atiation weather forecasiw has ordy re-
cently become amiIable to civil aircraft, and not yet
to all of them, while military aircraft have had their
own aviation weather semice for yems. ?JIyingopera-
tions have regularly been curtailed because of the
prediction of bad weather conditions. Lacking such
service, civil eircraft have frequently flown into bad
weather of which they had no warning, or have attempt-
ed schedukd flights wit-h inadequate information
regarding weather conditions Some cdasses of civil
flying, mail for instance, proceeded in the face of known
weather conditions when neither rnilitmy nor other
civil aviation would normally be operating.
It is obvious that the personaI element must enter
any anaIysis such as this’. The percentages assigned
various types or caus~ can not be considered es abso-
lute, but the &rea do represent the fairest estimate
avaiIable.
The above remarks shouId be kept clearIy in mind,
together with a thorough appreciation .of the m.rying
difEcuWa encountwed by piIota and airplanes while
meeting the requimnents of operation in the two
departments of atiation. It is the belief of the com-
mittee that the comparati~e tables may then be studied
with profit.
CONCLUSION
The Committee on Aircraft Accidents bdieves that
the practical value of the accident analysis chart pre-
pared by the SpeciaI Committee on the Ifomencla-
ture, Subdivision, and Ckssiflcation of Aircraft Acci-
dents, and the importance of the information which
may be obtained from the use of this chart, have been
c~early demonstrated in its use in service in the War,
~a~, and Commerce Departments.
As a result of experience, there have been introduced
into the present report some minor changes in defini-
tions and nomenclature, which changes, howewr, ar~
in conformity with the classifications aIready set up.
Ofparticuhrint~t,i ntheopinion of the committee,
are tie new data in tabk?s and discussion relating to
FTatureof Aircraft Accidents and Causes of Accidents,
giving comparisons between the ditary and ckil
operations. ‘With two or three exceptions, the agree-
ment both for NTatureand Causes of Accident between
the two classes of operation is noteworthy.
The corcniittee has given careful consideration to
the physiological and psychological probkcna involved
in the piIoting of aircraft as having an important
bearing on the number and types of accidents which
occur. In this study the cummittee has been ably
assisted by representatives of the mechcal personnel of
the nad flying service, the Army Air Corps, and the
Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce.
No definite recommendaf+ms along this line have been
formulated, but it is beheved that the discussions of
these problems in the meetings of the committee have
been of considerable value to the representati~es of the
three servic= in their study of &craft accidents in
their respective organizations.
In presenting this report for publication the com-
mittee appreciates that it can not represent 8 com-
pleted project, ss the study of aircraft accidenta can
never be finished. The report represents the experi-
ence of the committee and of the three departments
concerned in the study of aircraft accidents up ta the
prtsent time. The study of ahcraft accidents for the
purpose of analyzing them m such a mmner as to
assist in reducing their ftequency and severity is a
task which can never be ccmpIeted, but must be
continued in step with the progress of the art.
Respectfully submitted.
Commmm ON bORAFT ACCIDENTS,
GEORGEK. BURGESS,Chairman.
‘WASmm+ToN,D. C., January 98,1930.
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